The India - Pakistan War

The correct terminology for the Indo- Pak War of 1971 is the Liberation War of Bangladesh, as it led to the independence of Bangladesh.

Interestingly, many historians point out that Major Ziaur Rahman, under the influence of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, had already claimed the independence of Bangladesh and a Bangladesh government was in existence as early as 26 March 1971. They claim that the country already had a Bangladesh Army, and so, the war was not between India and Pakistan but between Pakistan and Bangladesh backed by India. This terminology is held to be politically correct for it helped the Members of East Pakistan Regiment to fight the Pakistan Army without being treated as mutineers since they were fighting under the command of a Bangladeshi Government.

The Partition had seen East Pakistan emerge as the majority province in terms of population, though the political power remained firmly in the hands of West Pakistanis, specifically the Punjabis. Since a straightforward system of representation based on population would have concentrated political power in East Pakistan, the West Pakistani establishment insisted on a scheme of "One Unit", where all of West Pakistan was considered a singular province. This was solely to counterbalance the East wing's votes.

After the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, political power began to be concentrated in the President of Pakistan, and eventually, the military. The nominal elected chief executive, the Prime Minister, was frequently sacked by the establishment, acting through the President. East Pakistanis noticed that whenever one of them, such as Khawaja Nazimuddin, Muhammad Ali Bogra, or Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy were elected as the Prime Minister of Pakistan, they were swiftly deposed by the West Pakistani establishment. Moreover, the military dictatorships of Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan, both West Pakistanis, only fostered such ill feelings.

When Sheikh Mujib's Awami League won a landslide victory in the national elections of 1970, winning 160 of the 162 seats allotted for East Pakistan, and a majority of the 300 total seats in the National Assembly, the West Pakistan establishment, led by the leader of Pakistan People's Party Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, refused to allow Mujib to form a government. On 3 March, 1971, the two leaders of the two wings along with the President General Yahya Khan met in Dhaka to decide the fate of the country. However, with the failure of the talks, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman called for a nation-wide strike. The East was convinced that they would never get their rightful political rights in a joint Pakistan and that independence was the only way out.

As political events gathered momentum, the stage was set for a clash between the Pakistan Army and East Pakistanis. From the days of the martial law in Bangladesh, various small maoist style paramilitary bands started emerging. The most important among them was the Mukti Bahini headed by Colonel Muhammad Ataul Gani Osmani, a retired Pakistani Army officer. This band was raised as Mujib's action arm and security force before assuming the character of a conventional guerrilla force. After the declaration of independence, the Pakistani military sought to quell them. However, with the emergence of other underground revolutionary bands such as the Bangladesh Army, formed mainly by Bengali soldiers, the Pakistani military began to feel the pressure. These Bengali units slowly merged into the Mukti Bahini and bolstered their weaponry. They then jointly launched operations against the Pakistani Army killing many in the process. This setback prompted the Pakistani Army to induct Razakars, Al-badr and Al-Shams (who were mostly current leaders of Jamaat-i-Islami) and other Bengalis who did not want Bangladesh to become an independent country. This aided Pakistan to stem the tide somewhat as the monsoon approached in the months of June and July.

Not losing heart by this setback, the Mukti Bahini regrouped as they gained in strength and capability. Aided by the Indian government in West Bengal, they were equipped and trained to counter the Pakistan Army. As there was no action during the monsoon, it was seen by the Pakistan military brass as a weakening of the Bangladesh cause. However the fire was merely lying beneath the ashes. After sensing the magnitude of the issue, the army was beefed up as troop strength was increased to more than 80,000. This caused a rise in tensions across the border as India realised the seriousness of the situation. The Indian military were preparing for the eventual onslaught with the aid of the separatists and waited for the end of the monsoon season to enable easy passage. The Indians aimed to bypass the villages and towns and concentrate on the cities and the highways which ultimately would lead to the capture of Dhaka.

Pakistan decided to nullify such an attack, and on December 3 launched a series of preemptive air strikes. The attack was modelled on the Operation Focus employed by Israel Air Force during the Six-Day War. However the plan failed to achieve the desired success and was seen as an open act of unprovoked aggression against the Indians. The Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi then ordered the immediate mobilisation of troops and launched the full scale invasion. This marked the official start of the India-Pak war with fighting commencing in West Pakistan. The Indian Army, far superior in numbers and equipment to that of Pakistan, executed a three-pronged pincer movement on Dhaka launched from the Indian states of West Bengal, Assam and Tripura. In all these places the Mukti Bahini and the local Bengalis played a vital role in aiding the Indian Army. Many soldiers were ferried in the night by the locals across rivers and valuable information on the location and whereabouts of different military strongholds were gleaned. It was backed up by the Indian Air Force which achieved near total air supremacy towards the end of the war as the entire East Pakistan airbase with all the flights was destroyed. The Indian Navy also annihilated the eastern wing of the Pakistan Navy and blockaded the East Pakistan ports, thereby cutting off any escape routes for the stranded Pakistani soldiers. The fledgling Bangladesh Navy (comprising officers and sailors who had defected from the Pakistani Navy) aided the Indians in the marine warfare in carrying out attacks like the Operation Jackpot.

Meanwhile, on the ground, nearly 3 brigades of Mukti Bahini along with the Indian forces fought in a conventional formation. This was supplemented by guerrilla style attacks on Pakistanis who were facing hostilities on land, air, water in both covert and overt ways. Undeterred, Pakistan tried to fight back and boost the sagging morale by incorporating the Special Services Group commandos in sabotage and rescue missions. This however could not stop the juggernaut of the invading columns whose speed and power were too much to contain for the Pakistani Army. On 16 December, within just 12 days, the capital Dhaka fell to the Mitro Bahini or the allied forces. Lt. Gen. Niazi surrendered to the combined forces headed by its commander Lt. Gen. Jagjit Singh Aurora by signing the Instrument of Surrender at Ramna Racecourse, 16:31 Indian Standard Time marking the liberation of Bangladesh.

However, the war also saw a large number of casualities. Though there are no official figures recorded, as there is a great disparity between the casuality figure put forth by India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, the mark of lives lost is estimated to be nearer to three millions. According to the journalist Robert Payne, Yahya Khan (on February 22 1971) told a group of generals, "Kill three million of them and the rest will eat out of our hands". The war also witnessed an inhuman slaughter of intellectuals and atrocities committed on women. Some sources point out that more than 200,000 women were raped and thousands of war babies were given birth.

On December 14 1971, only two days before surrendering to the Indian military and the Mukhti Bahini forces, the Pakistani army – with the assistance of local islamist leaders and groups that chose to ally themselves with the Pakistani military, most notably the Al Badr and Al Shams – systematicly executed well over 200 of East Pakistan's intellectuals and scholars. Professors, journalists, doctors, artists, engineers, writers were rounded up in Dhaka, blindfolded, taken to Rajarbag and brutually executed. In memory of this event, December 14 is mourned in Bangladesh as Buddhijibi Hotta Dibosh ("Day of Martyred Intellectuals").

On December 16 2002, the George Washington University’s National Security Archives published a collection of declassified documents, mostly consisting of communications between US officials working in embassies and USIS centers in Dhaka and in India, and officials in Washington DC. These documents show that US officials working in diplomatic institutions within Bangladesh used the terms ‘selective genocide’ and ‘genocide’ (Blood telegram) to describe events they had knowledge of at the time. They also show that President Nixon, advised by Henry Kissinger, decided to downplay this secret internal advice, because he wanted to protect the interests of Pakistan as he was apprehensive of India's friendship with the USSR, and he was seeking a closer relationship with China who supported Pakistan.

In his book “The Trials of Henry Kissinger”, Christopher Hitchens elaborates on what he saw as the efforts of Henry Kissinger to subvert the aspirations of independence on the part of the Bengalis. In elaborating, Hitchens not only claims that the term ‘genocide’ is appropriate to describe the results of the struggle, but also points to the efforts of Henry Kissinger in undermining others who condemned the then ongoing atrocities as being a genocide.

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